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INTRODUCTION
Royalty payments play a significant—if not central—role in oil and
gas exploration and production. The nature of the relationship between the
operator/mineral lessee and the parties owing a royalty payment, either by
contract or law, dictates the obligations and potential penalties faced by
the operator/mineral lessee. This Article recognizes that the
operator/mineral lessee assumes different statutory obligations depending
on its relationship with the mineral/royalty owner—in particular, whether
the obligee (here, the mineral interest owner) is unleased, leased, or holds
an overriding royalty interest. This Article encompasses three focus areas:
1. Statutory requirements for an unleased mineral interest owner,
lessor, and overriding royalty interest owner that trigger a timely
response from their respective operator/mineral lessee;
2. Jurisprudentially created expectations for adequate responses
from the operator/mineral lessee to the notice issued by an
unleased landowner, lessor, and overriding royalty interest owner;
and
3. Fact scenarios applying these statutes and jurisprudential rules.
I. UNLEASED MINERAL INTEREST OWNERS: THE DELAYS AND REMEDIES
AVAILABLE
Operators and mineral lessees owe their respective mineral interest
owners certain statutory obligations that, if violated, could subject
operators and mineral lessees to significant penalties. To avoid or
minimize the penalties, operators and mineral lessees must comply with

2022]

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS CONCERNING STATUTORY OBLIGATIONS

65

particular deadlines and provide specific information in response to
notices and requests depending upon the nature of their relationship with
their mineral and royalty interest owners.
When the operator does not have a valid oil, gas, or mineral lease with
its mineral interest owner, Louisiana Revised Statutes section 30:103.1
(“Section 103.1”) governs the relationship between the operator and
mineral interest owner pertaining to the reporting requirements. Courts
have painstakingly evaluated the terms of Section 103.1 to provide both
the operator and the unleased mineral interest owner clarity and
consistency regarding legal expectations and penalties derived from this
Section.
A. Why Must the Operator Provide Information Under Section 103.1?
Before addressing the “who,” “when,” “what,” and “how” of Section
103.1, the “why” should first be understood. The Louisiana Legislature
recognized that an operator needed an incentive—beyond good
stewardship—to notify the unleased mineral interest owner of the
operator’s activities. Consequently, the legislature enacted Louisiana
Revised Statutes section 30:103.2 (“Section 103.2”). Together, Sections
103.1 and 103.2 “provide a procedure by which the owner of unleased
lands in a drilling or production unit could have the amount of drilling
costs fixed, so that the remaining proceeds of the sale of production could
be released and he could obtain his proportionate part of those proceeds
without too great a delay.”1 Both parties benefit from these statutes as the
unleased mineral interest owner receives his share of the royalties and
required report, and the operator recoups well costs from the unleased
mineral interest owner’s share of the royalties.
Pursuant to Section 103.2, an “operator or producer shall forfeit his
right to demand contribution from the owner or owners of the unleased oil
and gas interests for the costs of the drilling operations of the well” when
the operator fails to comply with Section 103.1.2 Jurisprudence has
attempted to clarify the scope of costs contemplated under the statute. In
XXI Oil & Gas, the operator tried to limit the costs forfeited to “only to
those costs incurred prior to the establishment of production to drill and

Copyright 2022, by KELLY PERRIER.
 Kelly Perrier is a member of Gordon Arata Montgomery Barnett
McCollam Duplantis & Eagan, LLC’s New Orleans office.
1. Scurlock Oil Co. v. Getty Oil Co., 324 So. 2d 870, 876 (La. Ct. App.
1975).
2. LA. REV. STAT. § 30:103.2 (2021) (emphasis added).
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complete the well.”3 The Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal rejected
this position based on its reading of Section 103.2 in pari materia with
Section 103.1. The court held that “it is obvious that costs of drilling
operations includes [sic] the costs of ‘drilling, completing, and equipping
the unit well.’”4 Further, “‘drilling operations’ contemplate both drilling
and operational aspects of taking and producing oil and gas from land.”5
Thus, “‘costs of drilling operations’ includes both pre-production and
post-production costs.”6
In Dow, the United States District Court for the Western District of
Louisiana questioned the credibility of this conclusion.7 The operator
argued that the court in XXI Oil & Gas “mis-used the term of art ‘postproduction costs’ because the court was actually discussing drilling and
operating costs, which are production costs.”8 The court agreed postproduction costs “are those costs and expenses incurred after the
production has been discovered and delivered to the surface of the earth,”
such as “those related to taxes, transportation, processing, dehydration,
treating, compression, and gathering.”9 The unleased mineral interest
owner responded that “post-production costs are included in the forfeiture
provision if operators can deduct for them.”10 The unleased mineral
interest owner relied on Johnson’s holding that “operators cannot charge
unleased mineral interest owners post-production costs.”11 The Louisiana
Western District agreed that “it cannot decide whether post-production
costs are included in the statutory forfeiture scheme before it decides if the
operator can charge those costs to the unleased party in the first place.”12
As a result, the court deferred ruling on the matter until the parties had the
opportunity to adequately brief that specific issue.13

3. XXI Oil & Gas, LLC v. Hilcorp Energy Co., 206 So. 3d 885, 889 (La. Ct.
App. 2016) (emphasis added).
4. Id. at 890 (citing LA. REV. STAT. § 30:103.1(A)(1)).
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. See Dow Constr., LLC v. BPX Operating Co., No. 20-9, 2020 WL
6928320, at *3 (W.D. La. Nov. 24, 2020).
8. Id.
9. Id. at *2 (citing J. Fleet Oil & Gas Corp., L.L.C. v. Chesapeake La., L.P.,
No. 15-2461, 2018 WL 1463529, at *6 (W.D. La. Mar. 22, 2018)).
10. Id. at *3.
11. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Johnson v. Chesapeake La., LP, No. 161543, 2019 WL 1301985, at *5 (W.D. La. Mar. 21, 2019)).
12. Id.
13. Id. At the time this Article was published, the briefing was not available.

2022]

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS CONCERNING STATUTORY OBLIGATIONS

67

Regardless, the operator does not necessarily forfeit all pre- and postproduction costs by failing to comply with Section 103.1. In Brannon
Properties, the court ruled that the operator’s initial report did not contain
the degree of detail required by Section 103.1; however, the operator’s
subsequent quarterly reports did.14 The court then limited the operator’s
penalties for inadequate reporting to the forfeiture of “the costs of the
drilling operations of [the operator’s] well for the period covered by the
deficient report.”15 The Louisiana Third Circuit later adopted this
application and succinctly held that “[o]nce the operator or producer
complies with the statutory requirement, it would no longer be penalized
and could start deducting for the costs.”16
Based on the pertinent jurisprudence, at the very least, an operator may
forfeit production costs until it provides the unleased mineral interest
owner an adequate report. At the time of this Article’s publication, the
possibility of forfeiting post-production costs remains unsettled.
B. Who Must an Operator Treat as an Unleased Mineral Interest Owner
Under Section 103.1?
As contemplated under Section 103.1, only a party who qualifies as
an unleased mineral interest owner has the right to demand the royalties
and reporting outlined in the statute. Fortunately, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit resolved any purported ambiguity
regarding the scope of this term by limiting it to circumstances where the
operator does not have a lease from the specific mineral interest owner.
In T D X Energy, the Commissioner of Conservation created the unit
well at issue located in DeSoto Parish.17 At the time the unit well was spud,
a portion of the unit’s acreage had not yet been leased.18 Before drilling on
the unit well was completed, the landowner leased the rights of the
previously unleased acreage to a third party; however, the lease was not
recorded until after drilling had ended.19 Thus, while the acreage was
ultimately leased before the unit well’s completion, the operator was

14. Brannon Props., LLC v. Chesapeake Operating, Inc., 514 F. App’x 459,
461 (5th Cir. 2013).
15. Id. at 462 (emphasis added).
16. XXI Oil & Gas, LLC v. Hilcorp Energy Co., 206 So. 3d 885, 890 (La. Ct.
App. 2016).
17. T D X Energy, L.L.C. v. Chesapeake Operating, Inc., 857 F.3d 253, 258
(5th Cir. 2017).
18. Id.
19. Id.
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unaware that the mineral interests had been leased until the lease was
recorded after completion of the drilling operations.20
TDX Energy, L.L.C. (“TDX”) acquired the lease to this acreage from
the original lessee.21 TDX then notified the operator of its interest in the
unit well and requested an accounting under Section 103.1.22 The operator
failed to respond within the statutory delay period and also failed to
provide the necessary information.23 To justify these failures, the operator
argued that Section 103.1 did not entitle TDX to receive the requested
reports, as TDX was not an unleased mineral interest owner.24 In
considering the operator’s and TDX’s competing interpretations of
Section 103.1, and particularly analyzing the language in Part A, the
United States Fifth Circuit held as follows:
The most natural reading of sections 103.1 and 103.2 is that
operators forfeit their right to contribution when they fail to send
timely reports to lessees with oil and gas interests in lands upon
which the operator has no lease, and that interpretation is most
consistent with the statute’s context and purpose.25
Thus, the operator owed TDX the reporting required by Section 103.1.26
The United States Fifth Circuit considered a number of statutes and
cases when reaching its holding, even addressing the operator’s attempt at
invoking equity principles.27 In the end, the court provided a clear
expectation of the scope of parties with the right to receive reports under
Section 103.1: all mineral interest owners in the unit with whom the

20. See id. It is unclear if the outcome would have been different if the
operator knew of the lease or if the lease was recorded during drilling, but the
lessee was not the operator’s lessee.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 259.
25. Id. at 264 (second emphasis added).
26. See id.
27. See id. at 267. The court recognized that the operator made valid equity
arguments regarding a potential loophole exploited by TDX. See id. Specifically,
TDX had the benefit of not participating in the well costs but reaping the benefits
of the unit well’s production. Id. In response, the court held that “[w]hen the text
of the law is clear, however, the court may not resort to equity.” Id. (citing LA.
CIV. CODE art. 4 (2021); Brannon Props., LLC v. Chesapeake Operating, Inc., 514
F. App’x 459, 460–62 (5th Cir. 2013)). “In this case, the text limited the time to
provide notice to before the well was complete.” Id.
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operator itself does not have an oil, gas, or mineral lease may rightfully
demand reporting under Section 103.1.
C. When Must the Operator Provide Information Under Section 103.1?
Courts seem to repeatedly tout strict construction in their
interpretations of Section 103.1 but somehow end up with drastically
different results in its application. In the name of “strict construction,”
some courts ironically have chosen to read an implicit requirement into
Section 103.1. Part A of Section 103.1 establishes the operator’s reporting
deadlines to provide “a sworn, detailed, itemized statement” as follows:
“[w]ithin ninety calendar days from completion of the well, an initial
report which shall contain the costs of drilling, completing, and equipping
the unit well” and “[a]fter establishment of production from the unit well,
quarterly reports.”28 Based on a plain reading of the quoted language
above, the operator has an affirmative duty to provide periodic reports,
namely an initial report followed by quarterly reports that are triggered by
the completion of the well. Part B of Section 103.1 sets out additional
deadlines for the operator to provide reports, which are triggered by the
operator obtaining previously unknown information: “However, the
operator or producer shall report the required information to the owner of
the unleased interest within thirty days after such information is obtained
by the operator or producer, or in the next quarterly report, whichever due
date is later.”29 Read together, the express language states that the operator
must provide an initial report to the unleased mineral interest owners
within 90 days of completing the well with a continuing obligation to
supplement reports quarterly.
Despite the perceived clear delays, courts do not assess penalties until
the unleased mineral interest owner affirmatively triggers these reporting
obligations as outlined in Part C of Section 103.1:
C. Reports shall be sent by certified mail to each owner of an
unleased oil or gas interest who has requested such reports in
writing, by certified mail addressed to the operator or producer.
The written request shall contain the unleased interest owner’s
name and address. Initial reports shall be sent no later than ninety
calendar days after the completion of the well. The operator or
producer shall begin sending quarterly reports within ninety
calendar days after receiving the written request, whichever is
later, and shall continue sending quarterly reports until cessation
28. LA. REV. STAT. § 30:103.1 (2021).
29. Id. (emphasis added).
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of production.30
Thus, while Part A states that an “operator or producer shall issue the
following reports”31 based on when it completes the well, and Part B states
that an “operator or producer shall report the required information”32 based
on when they obtain specific information, courts do not penalize operators
for a failure to comply with these obligations. Instead, courts allow the
operator to wait until information is formally requested as prescribed by
Part C before penalties are considered or implemented against the nonresponsive operator.
In an unreported 2013 decision affirmed by the United States Fifth
Circuit, the Louisiana Western District set out the sequence of requests
and responses it believed the Louisiana Legislature intended with regard
to Section 103.1.33 First, the initial letter from the unleased mineral interest
owner will not be considered a notification of a “failure to comply with”
Section 103.1.34 The Fifth Circuit explained that “[a]n operator [sic] or
producer’s duty under Section 30:103.1 is not triggered until a written
request is sent by certified mail.”35 Second, if the operator does not meet
its reporting requirements in response to the initial letter, “Section 103.2
allows the owner to then serve the operator with what is essentially a
notice of default,” in the form of a second letter.36 This second letter serves
as the requisite notification to the operator that the operator failed to
comply with Section 103.1.37 Third, the operator then has “a 30-day cure
opportunity, before the imposition of a harsh financial penalty on the
operator (and the grant of an unearned windfall to the owner).”38 Under
the decisions from the Adams courts, the operator has no affirmative duty
to provide the unleased mineral interest owner any information—without
the possibility of penalty—until the unleased mineral interest owner
expressly requests specific information pursuant to Section 103.1(A) two
separate times.
After receipt of the second letter, the operator must timely respond in
order to avoid penalties. While it is not necessarily evident from the
30. Id. (emphasis added).
31. Id. (emphasis added).
32. Id. (emphasis added).
33. See Adams v. Chesapeake Operating, Inc., No. 11-cv-1504, 2013 WL
1193716, at *5 (W.D. La. Mar. 21, 2013), aff’d, 561 F. App’x 322 (5th Cir. 2014).
34. Adams, 561 F. App’x at 325.
35. Id. (emphasis added).
36. Adams, 2013 WL 1193716, at *5 (emphasis added).
37. See id.
38. Id.
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statute, the Adams district court held that the operator has (1) 90 days from
completion of the well and (2) 30 additional calendar days from the date
of the second letter to furnish the requisite reports.39 The Louisiana
Western District maintained this position in three subsequent cases.40
Thus, despite the explicit language of Parts A and B, the operator does not
have an affirmative obligation to send the unleased mineral interest owner
reports until that owner makes a formal request. Penalties will not be
levied until 30 days after said owner makes a second formal request that
subsequently goes unanswered or improperly answered.
While many courts espouse strict construction of Section 103.1, the
“default period” appears to be a judicial construction, as neither Section
103.1 nor Section 103.2 calls for two letters from the unleased mineral
interest owner to warrant the penalties under Section 103.2. The plain
language of Section 103.1 establishes that the operator owes the unleased
mineral interest owner specific information within 30 days of the request;
however, the operator does not suffer a consequence from his failure to
provide an adequate response until after the unleased mineral interest
owner sends a second letter. As a result, for practical purposes an unleased
mineral interest owner should be prepared to send two separate letters
before expecting benefits from Section 103.2. The operator, on the other
hand, can reasonably expect that a court will require two letters from its
unleased mineral interest owner before the operator forfeits well costs.
However, as this is a judicial construction, it would be prudent for the
operator to make its best efforts to respond to the first request within the
30-day statutory period.
D. What Must the Unleased Mineral Interest Owner Include in Its
Demand Under Section 103.1?
The unleased mineral interest owner bears the responsibility of
demanding information from the operator. Pursuant to Section 103.1(C),
39. See id. at *6.
40. See B.A. Kelly Land Co. v. Aethon Energy Operating LLC, No. 18-CV01243, 2019 WL 5021267, at *3 (W.D. La. Oct. 8, 2019), reconsideration denied,
18-CV-01243, 2019 WL 6542407 (W.D. La. Dec. 4, 2019), appeal filed, No. 2030090 (5th Cir. Feb. 12, 2020); M&N Res. Mgmt., LLC v. Exco Operating Co.,
LP, No. 14-cv-0238, 2017 WL 8809775, at *4 (W.D. La. Dec. 13, 2017);
Limekiln Dev., Inc. v. XTO Energy Inc., No. 20-CV-00145, 2021 WL 956079, at
*8 (W.D. La. Feb. 5, 2021), report and recommendation adopted by No. 20-cv00145, 2021 WL 950909 (W.D. La. Mar. 12, 2021) (“It is undisputed by the
parties that the statute requires a two-step notification requirement on behalf of
the unleased owner.”).
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the unleased mineral interest owner’s demand must (1) be sent in writing,
(2) by certified mail, (3) addressed to the operator or producer, and (4)
contain the unleased owner’s name and address. Jurisprudence expanded
these requirements to also require the unleased mineral interest owner (1)
identify the lands it owns,41 (2) identify the specific wells for which the
demand is being made,42 and (3) specifically cite a failure to comply with
Section 103.43
In Miller, the unleased mineral interest owner complied with the
requirements outlined in Section 103.1 and demanded the reporting from
the operator as authorized by the statute.44 On two occasions, the operator
requested that the unleased mineral interest owner identify the property
she owned.45 After the operator’s second request for additional
information, the unleased mineral interest owner “performed a title search
and identified 5.037 acres of land in Bossier Parish that she owned.”46 The
operator then provided the unleased mineral interest owner with the proper
reports and a check for the unleased mineral interest owner’s share in
production less costs.47 The unleased mineral interest owner filed an action
against the operator, asserting that the operator had no right to deduct
costs. The unleased mineral interest owner specifically asserted that the
report was not timely because it was not provided within 30 days of the
unleased mineral interest owner’s initial letter.48
The Louisiana Western District assessed all three letters submitted by
the unleased mineral interest owner to determine which letter constituted
the default notice that could lead to the forfeiture of costs.49 The unleased
mineral interest owner’s first letter appeared to comply with Section 103.1;
it identified her name and address and requested initial reports as required
by the statute.50 However, it was not until her third letter that she identified
the land she owned.51 The court recognized that no court had addressed

41. See Miller v. J-W Operating Co., No. 16-0764, 2017 WL 3261113, at *4
(W.D. La. July 27, 2017).
42. M&N Res. Mgmt., 2017 WL 8809775, at *7.
43. Miller, 2017 WL 3261113, at *5 (citing LA. REV. STAT. § 30:103.2
(2021); Adams, 561 F. App’x at 325); see also B.A. Kelly Land Co., 2019 WL
6542407, at *4.
44. Miller, 2017 WL 3261113, at *1.
45. See id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at *3.
49. See id.
50. Id.
51. See id.
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which party bears the responsibility of identifying the land at issue but
noted that “Louisiana courts have ruled that an oil and gas company was
not under an obligation to track down the address change or ownership
change of a lessee.”52 Applying this logic, the Louisiana Western District
held that “[i]t is [the unleased mineral interest owner’s] duty to know what
land she owns, not [the operator’s] duty to find out for her.”53 Without the
unleased mineral interest owner’s identification of the land she owned
within her demand, she could not trigger the Section 103.1 reporting
requirements or the Section 103.2 subsequent penalties.54
The same court later took that concept one step further, requiring that
the unleased mineral interest owner identify the specific well at issue for
a demand to be considered a default notice.55 In M&N Resources
Management, the unleased mineral interest owner submitted a demand
under Section 103.1 pertaining to the initial unit well.56 The operator
drilled seven more wells in the unit but did not provide the statutory
reporting.57 The Louisiana Western District held:
The answer may be debatable, but the court finds that even if an
owner’s original request obligates the operator to provide reports
with respect to future wells, the operator does not forfeit its right
to demand cost contribution with respect to those future wells
unless the owner sends a Section 103.2 notice of default and
provides an opportunity for a cure with respect to a particular well
or wells.58
The court concluded that “[a]t a minimum, the owner must place the
operator in default under Section 103.2 with respect to a particular well
and give the operator an opportunity to cure before the operator forfeits its
claim for contribution as to that well.”59 In short, the operator has an
obligation to provide the statutory reports, but there is no penalty for
failing to do so until the mineral interest owner sends a separate letter
identifying the specific wells.

52. Id. at *4 (citing Ross v. Enervest Operating, L.L.C., 119 So. 3d 943, 957
(La. Ct. App. 2013)).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See M&N Res. Mgmt. LLC v. Exco Operating Co., LP, No. 14-cv-0238,
2017 WL 8809775, at *4–6 (W.D. La. Dec. 13, 2017).
56. Id. at *2.
57. Id. at *3.
58. Id. at *6 (emphasis added).
59. Id. at *7.

74

LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES

[Vol. X

The operator in Limekiln further tested these limits.60 The operator
pleaded that the unleased mineral interest owner failed to achieve Section
103.1 notice by failing to identify the property interest at issue.61 The
operator acknowledged that the unleased mineral interest owner “included
in the subject line the name of the well it claimed to own,” and provided
an email “containing a description of the land it owns.”62 The operator
argued the information “was insufficient and non-compliant as a matter of
law and [could not] be subsumed into the subsequent certified mail
letter.”63 The court adopted a strict construction of Section 103.1(C) and
held that no other requirements besides “in writing, by certified mail
addressed to the operator or producer” existed.64 The unleased mineral
interest owner strictly complied with Section 103.1’s statutory
requirements and identified the drilling unit in which its property was
located.65 Thus, the court denied the operator’s motion to dismiss.
Section 103.2 contains the last element that must be included in a
proper Section 103.1 demand: the unleased mineral interest owner must
call the operator’s attention to its failure to comply with the provisions of
Section 103.1. In a recent decision, the Louisiana Western District
accepted nothing less than the “default” letter containing an express
reference to Section 103.1. In B.A. Kelly Land Co., the unleased mineral
interest owner sent the operator a letter (1) identifying the property the
unleased mineral interest owner owned within the operator’s unit and (2)
requesting “sworn, detailed, itemized statements of the costs and
production for these wells and units.”66 The operator asserted that the letter
failed to trigger Section 103.1 by “neither referenc[ing] § 103.1 itself, nor
request[ing] the ‘initial reports’ or ‘quarterly reports’ specifically
contemplated by the statute.”67 The court agreed with the operator in the
name of “strict construction.”68 Specifically, even though the court on

60. See Limekiln Dev., Inc. v. XTO Energy Inc., No. 20-CV-00145, 2021
WL 956079 (W.D. La. Feb. 5, 2021), report and recommendation adopted by No.
20-cv-00145, 2021 WL 950909 (W.D. La. Mar. 12, 2021).
61. Id. at *4.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at *8 (quoting LA. REV. STAT. § 30:103.1(C) (2021)).
65. Id. at *9.
66. B.A. Kelly Land Co. v. Aethon Energy Operating LLC, No. 18-CV01243, 2019 WL 5021267, at *5 (W.D. La. Oct. 8, 2019), reconsideration denied,
No. 18-CV-01243, 2019 WL 6542407 (W.D. La. Dec. 4, 2019), appeal filed, No.
20-30090 (5th Cir. Feb. 12, 2020).
67. Id.
68. Id.
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reconsideration held that “the failure to cite statutes was one of the factors
that the Court considered,”69 the only other “factor” the court considered
was stated as follows:
Significantly, the letter did not request “initial reports” or
“quarterly reports” as specifically provided for in Section 103.1.
Rather, the December 15, 2017 letter requested information for
each Well dating back to November 10, 2013, which was even
prior to the date [the operator] became operator. Such requests do
not comport with the specific language of Section 103.1.70
The court refused to allow a subsequent letter from the unleased mineral
interest owner to constitute the necessary default because the letter did
“not reference the Well Costs Reporting Statute (i.e., either §§ 103.1 or
103.2) and [did] not make any mention of a lawsuit, penalty, or forfeiture
under §103.2.”71 Therefore, based on B.A. Kelly Land Co., the unleased
mineral interest owner must craft a very deliberate letter to initiate
potential penalties under Section 103.2. The unleased mineral interest
owner appealed this decision to the United States Fifth Circuit, which is
currently pending at the time of this Article’s publication.
Section 103.2 provides the proverbial “teeth” to compel operators to
comply with Section 103.1. Courts do not underestimate the penal nature
of Section 103.2 and—in some instances—have engaged in tortured
analyses to avoid levying this penalty. To ensure an unleased mineral
interest owner complies with Section 103.1 and thus has the opportunity
to pursue penalties under Section 103.2, its request to the operator must
include the following elements:
1. In writing;
2. Issued by certified mail;
3. Include the name and address of the unleased mineral interest
owner;
4. Include the property owned by the unleased mineral interest
owner;
5. Expressly include a demand for an initial report and quarterly
reports;
6. Expressly reference Section 103.1 as the basis for the demand;
7. Expressly notify the operator that if it fails to comply, it
forfeits well costs under Section 103.2; and

69. B.A. Kelly Land Co., No. 18-CV-01243, 2019 WL 6542407, at *4.
70. Id. (emphasis added).
71. Id. at *4; see also B.A. Kelly Land Co., 2019 WL 5021267, at *6.

76

LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES

[Vol. X

8. Provide a new letter when future wells are drilled within the
same unit.
While the above requirements contain more information than arguably
required by the statute itself, courts are consistently reluctant to apply the
penalties of Section 103.2—matched only by those same courts’
reluctance to publish their opinions interpreting this statutory scheme.
E. How Must the Operator Respond to a Demand Under Section 103.1 to
Avoid Penalties?
Once the unleased mineral interest owner complies with its demand
requirements, the operator must provide specific information in a specific
format to avoid the enforcement of a penalty. Section 103.1 identifies two
separate reports expected from the operator: the initial report and the
quarterly reports. Both reports must be “sworn, detailed, [and] itemized.”72
Courts apply the “sworn” element literally and have expressly rejected
anything less.73 The Louisiana Third Circuit has reasoned that “[a]n
unsworn statement leaves mineral lessees . . . vulnerable to a degree that
[Section 103.1] seeks to prevent.”74 The initial report “shall contain the
costs of drilling, completing, and equipping the unit well.”75 Quarterly
reports “shall contain the following: (a) The total amount of oil, gas, or
other hydrocarbons produced from the lands during the previous quarter.
(b) The price received from any purchaser of unit production. (c) Quarterly
operating costs and expenses. (d) Any additional funds expended to
enhance or restore the production of the unit well.”76 The reports must
include itemized details pertaining to both pre-production and postproduction costs to comply with Section 103.1 and avoid subsequent
penalties.77
Fortunately, jurisprudence has provided additional guidance on the
scope of information that satisfies Section 103.1. In Brannon Properties,
the United States Fifth Circuit first addressed the level of detail required

72. LA. REV. STAT. § 30:103.1(A) (2021).
73. See, e.g., XXI Oil & Gas, LLC v. Hilcorp Energy Co., 206 So. 3d 885,
890–91 (La. Ct. App. 2016) (rejecting certified mail to constitute a “sworn”
report).
74. XXI Oil & Gas, LLC v. Hilcorp Energy Co., 124 So. 3d 530, 535 (La. Ct.
App. 2013).
75. LA. REV. STAT. § 30:103.1(A)(1).
76. Id. § 30:103.1(A)(2).
77. XXI Oil & Gas, LLC, 206 So. 3d at 890.
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to comply with the statute.78 The court held that “[a]lthough the statute
does not specify which details a report must contain, that lack of precision
does not necessarily make the provision ambiguous.”79 The court then
looked to the dictionary and the ordinary understanding of the term
“detailed enough.”80 In doing so, the court held, “The statute clearly
connects the costs reported to the benefits received in exchange. The
‘detailed’ requirement, therefore, must indicate that the report has to relate
the cost to the benefit: it must tell the unleased mineral owner what it is
getting for its money.”81 Further, the Brannon Properties court compared
the initial report issued by the operator to that same operator’s subsequent
quarterly reports, which the court deemed to satisfy the statute’s
requirements.82 The quarterly reports “included, in addition to a vendor
name and invoice number, a description of the service or parts
provided.”83 The court further held that the “itemization requirement
strongly suggests that the Louisiana Legislature intended the statute to do
more than simply notify the unleased mineral owner of the drilling
costs.”84 Because the operator “could and, as a standard practice, did
provide more information to satisfy the statutory requirement of a
‘detailed’ report,” the court ruled that the initial report failed to comply
with Section 103.1.85
The Louisiana Western District provides another example of
insufficient reporting. In M&N Resources Management, the court held that
“[b]eyond the fairly broad categories of expenses, the reports did not
provide any detail from which an owner could assess what it was getting
for its money and ensure itself that the operator was not running up
unnecessary expenses.”86 The court specifically noted that “the report did
not identify a vendor, cite an invoice number, or provide any description
of the actual goods or services received.”87 As a result, the operator
78. See Brannon Props., LLC v. Chesapeake Operating, Inc., 514 F. App’x
459, 460–62 (5th Cir. 2013).
79. Id. at 461 (citing State v. Evans, 38 So. 2d 140, 142–43 (La. 1948)).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 461–62 (emphasis added).
82. See id. at 461.
83. Id. The court also reviewed the operator’s report for a different well that
contained a “shorthand description of the part provided or service rendered for
each itemized expenditure.” Id.
84. Id. at 462.
85. Id. at 461–62.
86. M&N Res. Mgmt., LLC v. Exco Operating Co., LP, No. 14-cv-0238,
2017 WL 8809775, at *6 (W.D. La. Dec. 13, 2017).
87. Id.
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forfeited well costs until it provided a sufficient, sworn, and itemized
report.88
The operator cannot avoid reporting requirements—and the
subsequent penalties—even when the unleased mineral interest owner
elects to participate in the well after the unleased mineral interest owner
makes the proper demand and before the sworn, detailed, and itemized
statements are due. In XXI Oil & Gas, the operator issued an authorization
for expenditure, commonly referred to as an “AFE,” in response to the
unleased mineral interest owner demanding information pursuant to
Section 103.1.89 After the unleased mineral interest owner received the
AFE, the unleased mineral interest owner elected to participate.90 The
operator then assumed its obligation had been satisfied.91 The Louisiana
Third Circuit summarized the operator’s position as follows: “This
suggestion amounts to proposing that [the unleased mineral interest
owner] waived its statutory right to receive a sworn, detailed, itemized
statement of costs by electing to participate in the well after receiving the
AFE.”92 The court then held, “Strict construction leaves no room for such
an argument. The statute is unambiguous in its requirements, and [the
unleased mineral interest owner’s] election to participate does not alter the
clear requirements of the statute.”93 Therefore, once the unleased mineral
interest owner makes a valid demand under Section 103.1, the operator
must adhere to all reporting requirements, regardless of whether the
unleased mineral interest owner promptly elects to participate in the well.
As a result, based on the statute and jurisprudence, if the operator
responds with the following sworn information, it should not be penalized
under Section 103.2: (1) vendor name; (2) invoice number; and (3)
description of the services or goods provided.
F. Summary of the Why, Who, When, What, and How
Despite the purported clear language of Sections 103.1 and 103.2,
courts are reluctant to apply the harsh penalty of well cost forfeiture
against operators who inadequately comply with the statutes’ terms. At the
very least, Sections 103.1 and 103.2 establish an ominous framework—if
a court chooses to apply it.
88. Id.
89. XXI Oil & Gas, LLC v. Hilcorp Energy Co., 124 So. 3d 530, 532 (La. Ct.
App. 2013).
90. Id.
91. See id. at 534.
92. Id.
93. Id.

2022]

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS CONCERNING STATUTORY OBLIGATIONS

79

II. LESSORS: THE DELAYS AND REMEDIES AVAILABLE FOR UNPAID
ROYALTIES
The lessor must adhere to a similar process to that of the unleased
mineral interest owner to alert its respective lessee of unpaid royalties.
Like the unleased mineral interest owner, the lessor must notify its lessee
in writing of issues with the lessee’s royalty payments before taking any
other legal action. Also similar to the unleased mineral interest owner, the
lessor must incorporate specific information in its written notification in
order to trigger the delay for filing suit. Finally, like the unleased mineral
interest owner, the lessor cannot pursue particular remedies until a specific
delay period has run without receiving an adequate response or full
payment from its lessee.
The lessor has distinctly different considerations compared to the
unleased mineral interest owner. Unlike the unleased mineral interest
owner, a lessor may dispense with all notice requirements if the terms of
the lease allow it, typically in the form of a resolutory condition.94 Also
distinct from the unleased mineral interest owner, the lessor can demand
damages or lease cancellation, or both. Further, unlike the unleased
mineral interest owner, the lessor can receive these remedies even if the
lessee pays the lessor the royalties due within the statutory delay.
When the lease does not contain an express resolutory condition,
Louisiana Mineral Code articles 137–141 (“Articles 137–141”) govern the
procedure for a lessor to demand remedies if its lessee improperly pays
royalties.95
A. Why Must a Lessor Provide Its Lessee with Notice Before Filing Suit?
The Louisiana Legislature requires pre-suit notice for unpaid royalties
simply because the lessor can demand the extreme remedy of lease

94. Many oil, gas, and mineral leases contain a resolutory condition that
expressly dispenses with the notice requirements for unpaid or improperly paid
royalties when demanding lease cancellation. The Louisiana Third Circuit in
Stream Family Ltd. Partnership recognized one such example. See Stream Family
Ltd. P’ship v. Marathon Oil Co., 27 So. 3d 354, 359 (La. Ct. App. 2009) (“[I]n
the instance of willfully or persistently late or improper payment, LESSOR need
not give such notice and the lease shall resolve immediately.”). The Stream court
noted, “[W]hether the remedy of cancellation is available without a putting in
default depends upon the terms of the lease.” Id. (quoting Acquisitions, Inc. v.
Frontier Expls., Inc., 432 So. 2d 1095, 1101 (La. Ct. App. 1983)).
95. See LA. REV. STAT. §§ 31:137–31:142 (2021).
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cancellation if the lessee fails to pay the royalties due.96 Unfortunately, the
simplicity ends there as “[t]he area of dissolution of mineral leases for
nonpayment of production royalties has been one of the most, if not the
most confused and unsatisfactory areas of Louisiana mineral law.”97 The
legislature promulgated Articles 137–141 in an effort to “clarify and
improve the law in this area” by balancing the competing interests of the
lessor and its lessee.98 The redactors specifically acknowledged that
operators “have made substantial investments in producing properties the
security of title which the nature and size of their investment deserves.”99
Thus, the Articles “provide an impetus to timely payment of royalties due,
while giving lessees a reasonable way in which to avoid the harsh remedy
of cancellation.”100 The lessee should use that time—specifically, 30
days101—“to evaluate a non-payment situation and to make a decision
regarding whether the royalties allegedly due should be paid.”102
In short, the legislature recognized that the lessee should have the
opportunity to investigate the lessor’s demand for royalties before the
lessee is potentially subjected to lease cancellation through judicial action.
The legislature also considered that the lessee would need an extra
incentive to timely respond beyond the penalty of paying the royalties
owed. To accommodate these goals and promote judicial efficiency,
Article 137 requires written, pre-judicial notice from the lessor.
B. Who Can Make a Proper Demand Under Article 137?
While courts require notice for all royalty litigation,103 courts will not
extend the procedures and subsequent remedies of Articles 137–141 to a
putative class of lessors. Article 137 notice functions as the starting point
for both the 30-day delay to file suit and the lessee’s obligation to earnestly
investigate the complaint in an effort to avoid penalties.104 By its nature,

96. See id.
97. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:137 cmt. (2021).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Williams v. Chesapeake La., Inc., No. 10-1906, 2011 WL 1868750, at *2
(W.D. La. May 13, 2011) (quoting Lewis v. Texaco Expl. & Prod. Co., 698 So.
2d 1001, 1009 (La. Ct. App. 1997)).
101. See LA. REV. STAT. § 31:138.
102. Williams, 2011 WL 1868750, at *2 (quoting Lewis, 698 So. 2d at 1009).
103. See id. (citing Wilson v. Palmer Petrol., Inc., 706 So. 2d 142, 146 (La. Ct.
App. 1997); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:137 cmt.; Chevron USA, Inc. v. Vermilion
Par. Sch. Bd., 377 F.3d 459, 462 (5th Cir. 2004)).
104. See Chevron, 377 F.3d at 463 (citing LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:137 cmt.).
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the putative class does not specifically identify the parties asserting claims
but instead acts as a “placeholder” for potential parties with a right of
action.105 Consequently:
Permitting the demand to be made on a class basis . . . would
deprive the lessee of any real ability to respond within the
relatively short time period allowed and upset the balance of rights
between lessor and lessee carefully established by the Louisiana
Legislature in Mineral Code Articles 137 to 141.106
Significantly though, notice does not need to be provided by each and
every mineral lessor individually.107 The Louisiana Third Circuit held that
“[i]t is sufficient if the notice fully and completely notifies the lessee of
the demands of the named plaintiffs, as well as the intention of those
named plaintiffs to demand royalty payments on behalf of a class of
royalty owners.”108 The court did not elaborate on whether the “class of
royalty owners” referred to royalty owners that share an interest in the
identified property.109 Considering the various holdings, a lessor seeking
royalty payments of any kind, regardless of that lessor’s specific damages
sought, should assume it must send written notice before filing suit.
C. When Should a Lessor Make a Demand Under Article 137?
As a general matter, “Article 137 has been interpreted to require
written notice as a prerequisite to all royalty litigation.”110 Consequently,
unless the lease contains language stating otherwise, a lessor must comply
105. See id. The plaintiffs defined the putative class as “all royalty and
overriding royalty interest owners in all Louisiana mineral leases owned by [the
defendants].” Id.
106. Id.
107. See, e.g., Duhe v. Texaco, Inc., 779 So. 2d 1070, 1087 (La. Ct. App. 2001)
(citing Lewis, 698 So. 2d at 1001).
108. Id. (citing Lewis, 698 So. 2d at 1001).
109. See id. The court stated: “This very issue was before this court in January
1999, on an application by defendants for writs. We denied writs in an
unpublished opinion, and the supreme court denied writs in Duhé v. Texaco, Inc.,
98-2843 (La. 1/29/99), 736 So. 2d 830. We adhere to our previous ruling.” Id.
This earlier opinion could not be obtained.
110. Williams v. Chesapeake La., Inc., No. 10-1906, 2011 WL 1868750, at *2
(W.D. La. May 13, 2011) (emphasis added) (citing Wilson v. Palmer Petrol., Inc.,
706 So. 2d 142, 146 (La. Ct. App. 1997); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:137 cmt.
(2021); Chevron USA, Inc. v. Vermilion Par. Sch. Bd., 377 F.3d 459, 462 (5th
Cir. 2004)).
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with the pre-suit notice requirements when disputing royalty payments.
Courts have consistently rejected lessors’ efforts to circumvent this notice
requirement.
In Williams, the lessor filed suit against the operator, alleging the
operator “engaged in a scheme to sell the gas produced from the leased
premises to affiliated or associated entities at a price below market value
in an effort to profit from substantially reduced royalty payments,”
essentially alleging non-payment and underpayment of royalties.111 Even
though the lessor submitted written notice to the operator, the lessor
claimed that “written notice [was] not required under Article 137 of the
Louisiana Mineral Code because she [was] only seeking ‘unpaid royalties’
rather than ‘damages.’”112 The Louisiana Western District rejected this
argument.113 It recognized that “Louisiana courts have consistently held
that a mineral lessor does not have a right of action to complain of the
mineral lessee’s failure to make timely or proper royalty payments until
he gives written notices as required by Article 137.”114 Thus, the lessor’s
desired remedy does not dictate or obviate the necessity for notice.
In Wilson, the plaintiffs attempted to avoid Article 137 notice by
relying on a number of causes of action, including breach of implied
obligations of the mineral lessees, antitrust violations, and violations of
the Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices Act.115 The Louisiana First Circuit
Court of Appeal, however, recognized that “all of [the lessors’] claims are
for the underpayment of royalties.”116 When dismissing the suit based on
prematurity, the court reinforced the reach of Article 137 and held that a
“royalty claim does not lose its identity merely because it is characterized
as an antitrust claim.”117 Here, the court established that the notice
requirement cannot be avoided even if the unpaid royalty claim is
shrouded in other causes of action.
When a mineral lessor has any claim regarding royalty payments,
regardless of the remedy pursued or the extent of other asserted claims, the
mineral lessor must comply with Article 137’s notice requirement at the
risk of rendering all claims premature.

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id. at *1.
Id.
See id. at *2.
Id. (citations omitted).
Wilson, 706 So. 2d at 145.
Id.
Id.
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D. What Must a Mineral Lessor Include in Its Article 137 Notice?
The lessor must remember that Article 137 notice functions “merely
to inform the lessee he has not paid royalties deemed by the lessor to be
due.”118 This notice should not be confused with a “demand for
performance.”119 The mineral lessor may not want simple performance, as
the mineral lessor has the right to pursue lease cancellation and double
damages in addition to, or rather than, payment of royalties.120 As a result,
the lessor must incorporate specific information to ensure proper pre-suit
notice pursuant to Article 137. Courts assess each notice on a case-by-case
basis in light of the surrounding facts.121 By reviewing these individual
suits in globo, the jurisprudence establishes a framework for sufficient
written notice.
The demand “must be something more than the mere recitation of the
lessee’s contractual and statutory duty to pay royalties.”122 It must contain
enough relevant information to “reasonably alert the lessee and to allow
for an appropriate investigation of the problem by the lessee.”123
Additionally, it must actually demand the unpaid royalties due. Simply
demanding a remedy such as lease cancellation is not sufficient.124
In constructing this framework, courts have identified demands that
do not satisfy the requirements of Article 137. In CLK Co., the lessor’s
letter to the lessee requested an assignment of an overriding royalty.125 It
did not make a demand for, or specify a problem with, the royalty
payment.126 Additionally, no royalties were due at the time of the letter, as
the lessor sent his letter one month before the well at issue began

118. La. Oil & Gas Ints., L.L.C. v. Shell Trading U.S. Co., 949 F.3d 915, 919
(5th Cir. 2020) (citing Rivers v. Sun Expl. & Prod. Co., 559 So. 2d 963, 968–69
(La. Ct. App. 1990)).
119. See id.
120. See LA. REV. STAT. § 31:139 (2021).
121. La. Oil & Gas Ints., 949 F.3d at 919 (quoting Rivers, 559 So. 2d at 968–69).
Article 137 does not outline specific information to trigger the 30-day delay before
filing suit. See Chevron USA, Inc. v. Vermilion Par. Sch. Bd., 337 F.3d 458, 463 (5th
Cir. 2004).
122. CLK Co. v. CXY Energy, Inc., 972 So. 2d 1280, 1291 (La. Ct. App. 2007)
(quoting Lewis v. Texaco Expl. & Prod. Co., 698 So. 2d 1001, 1010 (La. Ct. App.
1997)).
123. La. Oil & Gas Ints., 949 F.3d at 919.
124. See, e.g., Rebstock v. Birthright Oil & Gas Co., 406 So. 2d 636, 643 (La.
Ct. App. 1981).
125. CLK Co., 972 So. 2d at 1291.
126. Id.
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producing.127 As a result, the Louisiana Third Circuit rejected the lessor’s
Article 137 claims by expressly denying double damages on appeal.128
More recently, in Louisiana Oil & Gas Interests, the lessor sent a letter
to its lessee notifying the lessee that the lessor was a new payee.129
However, the letter “did not complain that [the lessee] had failed to make
royalty payments or that ‘improper’ payments had been made.”130 As a
result, the lessor’s letter did not satisfy Article 137’s requirements.131
Similarly, in Ross, the lessors’ letter introduced the lessors as purchasers
of the underlying property and requested any royalties sent to the former
owner be sent to them.132 The Louisiana Second Circuit Court of Appeal
characterized the correspondence as “merely an introductory letter” and
held that it did not satisfy Article 137’s notice requirements.133 Finally, in
Rivers, the court rejected a five-page letter containing “the lessors’
concern over some discrepancy in the price paid for production.”134 The
court held that “the lessees could have reasonably concluded that the letter
was intended as notice of the alleged deficiency in the price and was not a
notice of any deficiency or failure to pay for production.”135 Consequently,
it did not constitute Article 137 notice.
In the above-referenced cases, the courts considered the letters as
informative but short of sufficient Article 137 notice. In O’Neal, the tone
of the lessor’s letter could not be characterized as merely informative.136
At first glance, the lessor’s obvious frustration suggests that a valid
demand was made: “After repeated telephone demands made during the
months of December 1998, January 1999 and February 1999, for my
royalties from the above-referenced well you have sent me a check for the
production month of November 1998 which I received during March
1999.”137 The Louisiana Second Circuit held that the letter failed to meet
the requisite pre-judicial notice by reasoning that the “letter was neither a

127. Id.
128. Id.
129. La. Oil & Gas Ints., L.L.C. v. Shell Trading U.S. Co., 949 F.3d 915, 920
(5th Cir. 2020).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Ross v. Enervest Operating, L.L.C., 119 So. 3d 943, 960 (La. Ct. App.
2013).
133. Id.
134. Rivers v. Sun Expl. & Prod. Co., 559 So. 2d 963, 969 (La. Ct. App. 1990).
135. Id. at 970.
136. See O’Neal v. JLH Enters., Inc., 862 So. 2d 1021, 1031 (La. Ct. App.
2003).
137. Id.
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desire for performance nor used to inform [the lessee] that it has not paid
royalties.”138 Instead, the letter confirmed that the November 1998
royalties had been paid, just more than 30 days after the lessor first
telephoned the lessee about it.139 As a result, the lessor failed to trigger
Article 137’s obligations.140
Fortunately, jurisprudence also addresses numerous situations that do
satisfy the requirements of proper Article 137 notice. In Samson Contour
Energy E & P, the Louisiana Second Circuit held the lessor provided
sufficient Article 137 notice when the letter (1) expressly notified the
lessee that royalties were due from production in a specific section, (2)
identified the wells and issue, and (3) directed the lessee to a likely error
on the lessee’s part.141 In Lewis, the Louisiana First Circuit rendered the
same ruling when the letter (1) demanded royalties on behalf of five
specifically identified royalty owners, (2) described certain mineral leases
covering the property at issue, (3) demanded payment of royalties, and (4)
requested an accounting of all royalties.142 The court explained that the
“lessee would be at a severe disadvantage” if a broad letter demanding
royalties would suffice.143 Further, such allowable vagueness would
encourage a lessor to “regularly and routinely send out such a general
demand, regardless of whether he knew of any specific problem with the
payment of his royalties.”144
In sum, a court will not imply a purpose in the lessor’s letter that is not
expressly evident on its face. No length, tone, or detail waives the
obligation to (1) identify the lessor; (2) identify the specific portion of
property, lease or well; and (3) state that royalties are due.
E. How Must the Lessee Respond to a Demand Under Article 137 to
Avoid Penalties?
A lessor can seek two types of remedies under Article 137, either
alternatively or collectively: monetary compensation and/or lease
cancellation. In contradiction of express legislation, some lessees have
asserted that payment within the 30 days provides protection from
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. See Samson Contour Energy E & P, L.L.C. v. Smith, 175 So. 3d 967, 974
(La. Ct. App. 2014).
142. See Lewis v. Texaco Expl. & Prod. Co., 698 So. 2d 1001, 1010–11 (La.
Ct. App. 1997).
143. Id. at 1010.
144. Id.
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penalties. When the lessee pays royalties within 30 days of the Article 137
demand, the Louisiana Legislature limits the availability of lease
cancellation to circumstances when the lessee’s original failure to pay was
fraudulent.145 If the court finds fraud, it may also award interest on the sum
from the date the royalties were due and impose reasonable attorneys’
fees.146
Courts have presumed that the title of Article 139, “Effect of payment
in response to notice,” refers to the correct amount of payment.147 Thus,
the language of “the statute clearly demonstrates that mere payment of the
royalties due in response to a written demand does not end the lessee’s
potential exposure to additional damages.”148 The Louisiana Western
District clarified that “the Mineral Code clearly contemplates the
possibility of additional damages being awarded to a lessor, despite the
lessee’s payment, in the event the nonpayment was fraudulent or willful
and without reasonable grounds.”149 As a result, a lessee may not avoid
potential penalties by simply paying the demanded royalties within 30
days of receiving the Article 137 notice.
Additionally, a lessee does not avoid potential penalties by filing a
concursus proceeding after the lessor demands payment, as the concursus
does not create any presumption against fraud or willful and unreasonable
withholdings.150 In Oracle 1031 Exchange, the Louisiana Third Circuit
held, “It is certain that [the lessees] knew that they had to pay someone,
and it is clear that they chose not [to do] so until prompted.”151 As a result,
the court affirmed the trial court’s finding that the lessees’ behavior was
“either fraudulent or willful and without reasonable grounds.”152 Courts
have shown commitment to a case-by-case analysis, possibly to

145. See LA. REV. STAT. § 31:139 (2021).
146. See id.; see also Quality Env’t Processes, Inc. v. IP Petrol. Co., 219 So.
3d 349, 377–78 (La. Ct. App. 2017) (affirming the district court’s award of double
the royalties owed based on the finding that the lessee’s delay in payment was
either fraudulent or willful and without reasonable grounds. The court also held
that interest on attorneys’ fees begins to run from the date the attorneys’ fees are
awarded).
147. See, e.g., Alyce Gaines Johnson Special Tr. v. El Paso E & P Co. L.P.,
No. 11-1992, 2013 WL 686580, *1 (W.D. La. Feb. 24, 2013).
148. CLB Props., Inc. v. MRD Operating LLC, No. 16-1271, 2017 WL
4323587, at *4 (W.D. La. Sept. 27, 2017).
149. Id. (emphasis added).
150. See Oracle 1031 Exch., LLC v. Bourque, 85 So. 3d 736, 742 (La. Ct. App.
2012).
151. Id.
152. Id. (quoting LA. REV. STAT. § 31:139 (2021)).
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discourage lessees from waiting for the lessor’s written demand before
paying sufficient royalties.
If the court finds that fraud did not play a role in the failure to timely
pay royalties (often in the form a clerical error or miscalculation),153
interest remains available. The lessor can also collect attorneys’ fees if the
lessee fails to pay the interest within 30 days of the lessor’s demand for
it.154 Consequently, the best response appears to be to take action before
the lessor sends its demand.
Article 140 governs the consequences for a lessee who fails to
reasonably act—by payment or explanation—within the deadline. While
the article mandates only the payment of proper royalties, the court has
“great discretion in awarding damages of double the amount of royalties
due.”155 In addition to awarding damages double the amount of royalties
due, the court may award interest on that sum from the due date, attorneys’
fees, and/or lease dissolution or cancellation.156 The jurisprudence
contains numerous instances where lessors attempted these remedies,
providing both lessors and lessees some level of predictability on how a
court will assess penalties. More often than not, courts shy away from
awarding anything more than the owed royalty when the lessee’s neglect
or oversight caused the failure.157
Double royalties are “a maximum penalty [that] should be reserved for
the most blameworthy conduct.”158 Historically, courts have struggled
over whether the legislature intended for the lessor to be awarded its
unpaid royalties plus two times the unpaid royalties, or simply two times
the unpaid royalties. In Gloria’s Ranch, the lessor believed the lease at
issue had expired for lack of production in paying quantities and requested
the lessees provide information confirming or denying the lessor’s
153. See Rivers v. Sun Expl. & Prod. Co., 559 So. 2d 963, 970 (La. Ct. App.
1990) (holding that the letter did not properly notify the lessee of a failure to pay
the claim, as it simply provided notice that the price was inaccurate); see also
Adams v. BP Am. Prod. Co., No. 10-1607, 2012 WL 1038035, *5 (W.D. La. Mar.
27, 2012) (holding that the operator’s request for certain documentation to
establish heirship was reasonable and did not warrant any penalties under Article
137).
154. See LA. REV. STAT. § 31:140.
155. See Samson Contour Energy E & P, L.L.C. v. Smith, 175 So. 3d 967,
977–78 (La. Ct. App. 2014) (citing O’Neal v. JLH Enters., Inc., 862 So. 2d 1021,
1031 (La. Ct. App. 2003); Matthews v. Sun Expl. & Prod. Co., 521 So. 2d 1192,
1196 (La. Ct. App. 1988)).
156. See LA. REV. STAT. § 31:140.
157. See, e.g., Fuller v. Franks Petrol., Inc., 501 So. 2d 1024, 1031 (La. Ct.
App. 1987).
158. Samson Contour Energy, 175 So. 3d at 981.
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position.159 The lessees responded that the lease was operating at a profit
but did not identify the specific wells that were producing.160 The lessor
filed suit demanding the lessees furnish a recordable act evidencing the
expiration of the lease and later amended the petition to plead unpaid
royalties for the wells allegedly keeping the lease active.161 The lower
courts held that the lessees failed to both pay the demanded royalties and
to respond.162 As a result, the lessees’ conduct warranted double
damages.163 In its ruling, the Louisiana Supreme Court established the
proper manner to calculate such damages, holding that “we interpret La.
Mineral Code art. 140 as authority to award up to double the amount of
royalties due.”164 Accordingly, double royalties—not unpaid royalties plus
double royalties—represent the cap for compensatory damages and will
not be awarded lightly.165
Lease cancellation represents the second and more extreme remedy.
Because many courts recognize the harshness of this remedy,
unsurprisingly few courts actually apply it. In the same Gloria’s Ranch
case, the Louisiana Second Circuit awarded the lessor lease cancellation
as a remedy.166 The court recognized that “dissolution should be granted
only if the conduct of the lessee, either in failing to pay originally or in
failing to pay in response to the required notice, is such that the remedy of
damages is inadequate to do justice.”167 The court determined that the
lessees knew they owed royalties for the well at issue for “almost two years
before [the lessor] filed suit against the [lessees] and approximately four
years before [the lessor] notified the [lessees] of their failure to pay
royalties.”168 The lessees also failed to provide the lessor with any
response regarding the well at issue.169 The court then held that
159. Gloria’s Ranch, L.L.C. v. Tauren Expl., Inc., 252 So. 3d 431, 434–35
(La.), reh’g granted in part, 251 So. 3d 392 (2018).
160. Id. at 435.
161. Id.
162. See id. at 434–36.
163. Id. at 444–46.
164. Id. at 446. While a court can always award less than double damages, a
court cannot award more than double damages.
165. See Samson Contour Energy E & P, L.L.C. v. Smith, 175 So. 3d 967, 981
(La. Ct. App. 2014) (“[W]e find that Samson’s failure to pay the correct royalty
amount does not involve the type of egregious conduct that would support the
court’s award of double the amount of royalties due.”).
166. Gloria’s Ranch, L.L.C. v. Tauren Expl., Inc., 223 So. 3d 1202, 1217 (La.
Ct. App. 2017), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 252 So. 3d 431 (La. 2018).
167. Id. (citing LA. REV. STAT. § 31:141 (2021)).
168. Id.
169. Id.
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“[c]onsidering these facts, there is a factual basis for the trial court to find
damages alone were insufficient to compensate [the lessor] for the
[lessees’] conduct, and we affirm the cancellation of the lease as to Section
15.”170 The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed and amended the decision
on other grounds but did not review this remedy.171 While courts recognize
that lease cancellation represents the harshest penalty for failure to pay
royalties, they will grant this remedy if the facts establish that monetary
damages are insufficient to compensate the lessor.
F. Summary of the Why, Who, When, What, and How
When an oil, gas, and mineral lease does not contain an express
resolutory condition waiving notice of inadequately paid royalties, the
parties rely on Article 137–141. The lessor must provide its lessee Article
137 notice to properly demand payment. Even if the lessee pays the
royalties due within 30 days of the Article 137 notice, the lessee may still
be subject to damages and lease cancellation if the court finds they acted
fraudulently or willfully without reasonable grounds. Article 140 governs
the penalties if the lessee fails to pay the royalties due within 30 days of
the Article 137 notice. The court exercises discretion over whether to
award twice the royalties or lease cancellation. This statutory scheme
provides the lessee an opportunity to investigate the alleged royalties
owed; however, the lessee must have a reasonable explanation for the
delay in paying royalties in order to avoid penalties.
III. OVERRIDING ROYALTY INTEREST OWNERS: THE DELAYS AND
REMEDIES AVAILABLE
The owner of an overriding royalty interest (“ORRI”) represents the
last royalty interest owner assessed in this Article. Like the unleased
mineral interest owner and lessor, the Mineral Code establishes the
framework for ORRI owners to follow when they suspect royalties are
being improperly paid. Unlike the unleased mineral interest owner and
lessor, the ORRI owner has significantly less jurisprudence to rely on for
guidance when making demands.
Mineral Code article 212.21172(“Article 212.21”) establishes the
notice prerequisite for judicial demand by the ORRI owner, with Mineral

170. Id. at 1217–18.
171. See Gloria’s Ranch, L.L.C. v. Tauren Expl., Inc., 252 So. 3d 431 (La.
2018), reh’g granted in part, 251 So. 3d 392 (2018).
172. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:212.21 (2021).

90

LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES

[Vol. X

Code article 212.22173 (“Article 212.22”) dictating the response necessary
from the obligor to avoid penalties. Mineral Code article 212.23174
(“Article 212.23”) outlines these penalties, which depend upon the
timeliness and explanation of the obligor:
a. If the obligor pays the royalties or production payments due plus
the legal interest applicable from the date payment was due, the
obligor has fulfilled its obligation and owes the ORRI nothing
else;175
b. If the obligor fails to pay within the 30 days from notice, but states
a reasonable cause for nonpayment, then damages shall be limited
to legal interest on the amounts due from the date due;176 and
c. If the obligor fails to pay and fails to state a reasonable cause for
failure to pay in response to the notice, the court may award as
double damages the amount due, legal interest on that sum from
the date due, and reasonable attorneys’ fees regardless of the
cause for the original failure to pay.177
The only way for an obligor to avoid any penalty is by paying the owed
royalty before the ORRI owner sends Article 212.21 notice.
A. Why Must an ORRI Owner Provide Its Obligor with Notice Before
Filing Suit?
The scant jurisprudence applying these articles does not expressly
address why the Louisiana Legislature requires pre-suit notice. While the
explanation is likely the same as that for the unleased mineral interest
owner and lessor—to provide the obligor the opportunity to investigate the
claim—there may be one distinction.
Courts have dismissed suits as premature when the lessor does not
provide the requisite pre-suit notice.178 However, the Louisiana Western
District did not dismiss a suit as premature when an ORRI owner did not
expressly identify certain wells in its demand letter.179 Instead, the court
173. Id. § 31.212.22.
174. Id. § 31.212.23.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. (emphasis added).
178. See, e.g., Wilson v. Palmer Petrol., Inc., 706 So. 2d 142, 146 (La. Ct. App.
1997) (dismissing all claims as premature); see also Williams v. Chesapeake La.,
Inc., No. 10-1906, 2011 WL 1868750, at *2 (W.D. La. May 13, 2011) (requiring
pre-suit notice for all royalty claims, not only when demanded damages).
179. See Fairfield Energy Corp. v. Anadarko Petrol. Corp., No. 08-757, 2011
WL 4862141, *4 (W.D. La. Oct. 13, 2011).
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held that “[i]f [the ORRI owner] has nonpayment claims concerning other
wells, [the ORRI owner] may still seek recovery under contract law, but
[the ORRI owner] may not seek penalties under [Louisiana Revised
Statutes section] 31:212.21 for wells not discussed in the 2007 letters.”180
Based on this holding, the ORRI owner’s primary incentive for pre-suit
notice is the ability to demand penalties against the obligor.
The plain language of Article 212.21 further supports this conclusion,
providing that the ORRI owner “must give his obligor written notice of
such failure as a prerequisite to a judicial demand for damages.”181 It does
not state that the failure prevents the ORRI owner from filing suit.
Interestingly, this language does not greatly differ from Article 137.182
Thus, the ORRI owner’s ability to demand double damages and attorneys’
fees from the obligor appears to be the primary incentive for providing
adequate pre-suit notice.183
B. Who Can Make a Proper Demand Under Article 212.21?
Article 212.21 functions as the “catch-all” for those owed royalties not
addressed by other statutes. Article 212.21 identifies the proper actor as
“the owner of a production payment created out of a mineral lessee’s
interest or a royalty owner other than a mineral lessor.”184 However,
mineral lessors are not the only royalty owners excluded from this article.
Courts have rejected unleased mineral interest owners and working
interest owners from asserting claims under Article 212.21. In Adams, the
United States Fifth Circuit recognized as follows:
Because Section 31:212.21 is ambiguous as to the parties
encompassed within the statute, we examine the title of that
section of the Mineral Code to determine the scope of the statute.
Based on the title to Sections 31:212-23 [sic], it is apparent that
Sections 31:212.21-.23 were intended to cover the ‘purchasers of
mineral product payments.’185

180. Id.
181. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:212.21 (emphasis added).
182. See id. § 31:137 (“[H]e must give his lessee written notice of such failure
as a prerequisite to a juridical demand for damages or dissolution of the lease.”)
(emphasis added).
183. See id. § 31:212.23(C).
184. Id. § 31:212.21 (emphasis added).
185. Adams v. Chesapeake Operating, Inc., 561 F. App’x 322, 326 (5th Cir.
2014); J & L Fam., L.L.C. v. BHP Billiton Petrol. Props. (N.A.), L.P., 293 F.
Supp. 3d 615, 620 (W.D. La. 2018).
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The Louisiana Western District further clarified that “[r]ecovery under
[Article 212.21–.22] is limited to nonpayment of production payments or
royalties, but does not include working interests.”186 As a result, Article
212.21 claims can be asserted only by “purchasers of mineral product
payments,”187 such as ORRI owners.
C. When Should an ORRI Owner Make a Demand Under Article 212.21?
Claims exist under Article 212.21 when the ORRI owner believes the
obligor failed to properly pay owed royalties, such as by not providing “an
honest accounting of the wells’ production” to avoid a portion of the
payments due.188 In Fairfield Energy, the Louisiana Western District held
that the ORRI owner had no knowledge of inaccurate royalty payments
until conducting its audit.189 Consequently, the prescriptive period for
unpaid royalties did not begin to run until this discovery, which then
prompted notice under Article 212.21.190 In short, it is likely Article
212.21 notice is warranted under the similar facts that warrant Section
103.1 notice for unleased mineral interest owners and Article 137 notice
for lessors.
D. What Must an ORRI Owner Include in Its Article 212.21 Notice?
Due to the lack of jurisprudential guidance on the particular statute,
courts look to Article 137 in determining whether the ORRI owner has
provided an adequate demand under Article 212.21.191 Thus, “the notice
must be of a more specific nature, so as to reasonably alert the lessee and
to allow for an appropriate investigation of the problem by the lessee.”192
As with all of the other royalty claims, the ORRI owner must identify the
specific well(s) for which it is demanding royalties.193 The letter must also
identify an issue with the payments.

186. Fairfield Energy Corp. v. Anadarko Petrol. Corp., No. 08-757, 2011 WL
4862141, *3 (W.D. La. Oct. 13, 2011) (emphasis added) (citing La. Land & Expl.
Co. v. Pennzoil Expl. & Prod. Co., 962 F. Supp. 908, 922 (E.D. La. 1997)).
187. Adams, 561 F. App’x at 326; see also J & L Fam., 293 F. Supp. 3d at 620.
188. See Fairfield Energy Corp., 2011 WL 4862141, at *1.
189. Id. at *3.
190. Id.
191. See, e.g., CLK Co. v. CXY Energy, Inc., 972 So. 2d 1280, 1291 (La. Ct.
App. 2007).
192. Id. (quoting Lewis v. Texaco Expl. & Prod. Co., 698 So. 2d 1001, 1010
(La. Ct. App. 1997)).
193. See Fairfield Energy Corp., 2011 WL 4862141, at *4.
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In CLK Co., the initial letter “did not make a demand for the payment
of royalties or notify [the obligor] of a problem or deficiency with the
payment of royalties. Further, no royalties were due when the letter was
sent.”194 The subsequent letter, again, did not notify the obligor “of its
failure to pay royalties.”195 As a result, the letters did not comply with the
Article 212.21’s notice requirements, preventing the ORRI owner from
demanding double damages.196
The ORRI owner must also ensure that it provides the Article 212.21
notice to the proper party. The recipient of the Article 212.12 notice differs
from that of the other statutes, as many parties may owe the ORRI. For
this reason, the Louisiana Third Circuit clarified that an ORRI owner
should make the statutory demand against the party responsible for paying
the royalties.197 In Freeman, the Louisiana Third Circuit recognized that
“the overriding royalty claim burdens all of the working interest claims;”
however, the ORRI owner does not need to make a demand against all
working interest owners but only “the party responsible for properly
distributing the revenues from the well.”198
E. How Must the Obligor Respond to a Demand Under Article 212.21 to
Avoid Penalties?
The obligor has 30 days to either make payment or provide reasonable
cause for the non-payment, the failure of which subjects the obligor to
potential penalties of double damages, legal interest, and attorneys’ fees.199
If the obligor “provides reasonable cause for the failure to pay, then the
court may only award interest from the date the payments became due.”200
In Cimarex Energy, the court held that depositing disputed funds into the
court’s registry and initiating a concursus proceeding constituted a
“reasonable” response to the royalty demand.201 No other case provides
guidance as to what satisfies a “reasonable response.”

194. CLK Co., 972 So. 2d at 1291.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Freeman v. Block “T” Operating, LLC, 118 So. 3d 1279, 1285 (La. Ct.
App. 2013).
198. Id.
199. See LA. REV. STAT. §§ 212.22–.23 (2021).
200. Fairfield Energy Corp. v. Anadarko Petrol. Corp., No. 08-757, 2011 WL
4862141, *3 (W.D. La. Oct. 13, 2011) (citing LA. REV. STAT. § 212.23).
201. Cimarex Energy Co. v. Mauboules, 40 So. 3d 931, 946 (La. 2010). The
dissent in Cimarex adamantly disagreed with the majority’s conclusion,
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F. Summary of the Why, Who, When, What, and How
The answers to the questions regarding notice under Article 212.21
are similar to those of Article 137. The ORRI owner must notify its obligor
of a failure to pay owed royalties and identify the specific well(s) at issue.
Once the ORRI owner makes an adequate demand, legal interest accrues
from the date the royalties were due. If the obligor fails to respond within
30 days, the obligor may owe double damages, attorneys’ fees, and legal
interest.
CONCLUSION
The Louisiana Legislature has promulgated separate statutes
governing a shared obligation: payment of owed royalties. Under all
statutes, the party to whom the royalty is owed must provide the obligor
sufficient notice of the identity of the property or well(s) at issue and
expressly state that the obligor has failed to pay owed royalties. The
obligor has a duty to investigate the royalty owner’s claim at the risk of
substantial penalties. Thus, as with all relationships in life, accurate and
prompt communication from both parties provides the foundation of a
mutually satisfactory outcome.

particularly on the ground that the concursus was timely as it was not filed within
30 days of the initial demand. See id. at 948–49 (Knoll, J., dissenting).

